Commerce Clause Video, Obamacare+Medical MJ

Think about it. Obamacare case at the Supreme Court ended up saying— the government CANNOT force you to BUY healthcare. The Court also ruled that the government can penalize you if you don’t buy it, by making you pay. However the government could not force anyone to buy the healthcare plan because the Court stated that it violates the Commerce Clause.


Another prior case from Maine found that a non profit group could be treated under the Commerce Clause as an entity in interstate commerce, since it (the non profit) was as follows:

(b) The Court is unpersuaded by the Town’s arguments that the dormant Commerce Clause is inapplicable here, either because campers are not “articles of commerce,” or more generally because interstate commerce is not implicated. The camp is unquestionably engaged in commerce, not only as a purchaser, see e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 300-301, 85 S.Ct. 377, 382, 13 L.Ed.2d 290, but also as a provider of goods and services akin to a hotel, see, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,379 U.S. 241, 244, 258, 85 S.Ct. 348, 351, 358, 13 L.Ed.2d 258. Although the latter case involved Congress’ affirmative powers, its reasoning is applicable in the dormant Commerce Clause context. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326, n. 2, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1731, n. 2, 60 L.Ed.2d 250. The Town’s further argument that the dormant Clause is inapplicable because a real estate tax is at issue is also rejected. Even assuming, as the Town argues, that Congress could not impose a national real estate tax, States are not free to levy such taxes in a manner that discriminates against interstate commerce. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 596, 43 S.Ct. 658, 665, 67 L.Ed. 1117. Pp. ____-____.

(c) There is no question that if this statute targeted profit-making entities, it would violate the dormant Commerce Clause. The statute discriminates on its face against interstate commerce: It expressly distinguishes between entities that serve a principally interstate clientele and those that primarily serve an intrastate market, singling out camps that serve mostly in-staters for beneficial tax treatment, and penalizing those camps that do a principally interstate business. Such laws are virtually per se invalid. E.g., Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. —-, —-, 116 S.Ct. 848, 854, 133 L.Ed.2d 796. Because the Town did not attempt to defend the statute by demonstrating that it advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives, e.g., Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality of Ore., 511 U.S. 93, 101, 114 S.Ct. 1345, 1351, 128 L.Ed.2d 13, the Court does not address this question. See Fulton Corp., 516 U.S., at —-, 116 S.Ct., at 856. Pp. ____-____.

  The Court has already held that the dormant Clause applies to activities not intended to earn a profit, Edwards v. California,314 U.S. 160, 172, n. 1, 62 S.Ct. 164, 166, n. 1, 86 L.Ed. 119, and there is no reason why an enterprise’s nonprofit character should exclude it from the coverage of either the affirmative or the negative aspect of the Clause, see e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326, n. 2, 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1731, n. 2, 60 L.Ed.2d 250. Whether operated on a for-profit or nonprofit basis, camps such as petitioner’s purchase goods and services in competitive markets, offer their facilities to a variety of patrons, and derive revenues from a variety of local and out-of-state sources. Any categorical distinction on the basis of profit is therefore wholly illusory. Pp. ____-____.